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Abstract 
The current study investigated cultural and psychological factors associated with intentions to 
reduce the spread of COVID-19. Participants (n = 704) completed measures of individualism-
collectivism, belief in conspiracy theories about COVID-19, feelings of powerlessness, and 
intentions to engage in behaviours that reduce the spread of COVID-19. Results revealed that 
vertical individualism negatively predicted intentions to engage in social distancing, directly 
and indirectly through belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Vertical collectivism 
positively predicted social distancing intentions directly. Horizontal collectivism positively 
predicted social distancing intentions indirectly through feelings of powerlessness. 
Furthermore, horizontal collectivism positively predicted hygiene-related intentions both 
directly and indirectly through lower feelings of powerlessness. These findings suggest that 
promoting collectivism may be a way to increase engagement with efforts to reduce the 
spread of COVID-19. They also highlight the importance of examining the interplay between 
culture and both personal feelings (powerlessness) and information consumption (conspiracy 
theories) during times of crisis.  
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Cultural orientation, powerlessness, belief in conspiracy theories, and intentions to 
reduce the spread of COVID-19 
In March 2020, the global COVID-19 crisis was officially labelled a pandemic 
(WHO, 2020a). Governments around the world have since taken unprecedented steps to 
mitigate the spread of the virus, such as encouraging social distancing and improving hygiene 
practices. Making these measures work is a significant challenge for governments (Tominey, 
2020). It is therefore important to understand what factors influence people’s intentions to 
comply. Researchers have emphasised the importance of considering social psychological 
factors in attempts to limit the spread of COVID-19 (van Bavel et al., 2020). Drawing on 
social psychological expertise, advisory groups have specifically highlighted the role that 
cultural factors could play in people’s intentions to engage with government instructions 
(SAGE, 2020). In the current research, we examine the link between cultural orientation and 
people’s intentions to engage in behaviours to reduce the spread of COVID-19. We further 
examine two potential mediators of this relationship, namely, conspiracy theories 
surrounding COVID-19 (Sweney & Waterson, 2020) and feelings of powerlessness (Xiang et 
al., 2019; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, b). 
Culture and intentions to reduce the spread of COVID-19 
Cultural psychology has paid particular attention to the dimensions of individualism, 
which focuses on prioritising individual needs above the group’s, and collectivism, which 
focuses on prioritising group needs above the individual’s (see Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Research has consistently shown that collectivist (versus individualist) cultures demonstrate 
greater compliance and adherence to social norms (e.g., Kim et al., 1994). In collectivist 
societies, it is ideal to meet social duties and obligations to maintain group harmony (Miller, 
Bersoff & Harwood, 1990), whereas individualist societies tend to promote personal freedom 
over harmony (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). These cultural orientations can also be measured 
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at the level of the individual—that is, within a society some people have a more individualist 
(versus collectivist) orientation than others (Triandis & Singelis, 1998). This is further broken 
down into vertical individualism (viewing the self as an autonomous individual who accepts 
inequality), horizontal individualism (viewing the self as an autonomous individual who 
prefers equality), vertical collectivism (viewing the self as part of a collective whilst 
accepting inequality), and horizontal collectivism (viewing the self as part of a collective that 
emphasises equality; Singelis et al., 1995).  
Adherence to social norms is an important response to collective crises (see Murray et 
al., 2011; see also Atran, 2012 for different perspectives). Following the COVID-19 
pandemic, behavioural science advisors in the UK have emphasised that promoting a sense of 
collectivism in individuals could reduce instances of public disorder, increase self-policing, 
and promote social norms about what constitutes appropriate pandemic behaviour (SAGE, 
2020). A sense of collectivism may improve people’s attitudes toward actions that involve 
personal sacrifices. Supporting this idea, at the cultural level Gelfand et al. (2020) found that 
tighter cultures (considered more collectivist; e.g., Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea) 
have been able to contain the spread of the virus more efficiently and effectively than looser 
cultures (considered more individualist; e.g., the USA, Spain, and Italy).  
Further indirect evidence points to the potential importance of individualism-
collectivism in predicting intentions to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Specifically, 
research examining climate change perceptions has demonstrated that individualists are less 
likely than collectivists to engage in climate-friendly actions that involve personal sacrifice 
(Xiang et al., 2019). Considering these findings, we expect that individualism will have 
negative, and collectivism will have positive, implications for adherence to behaviours aimed 
at reducing the spread of COVID-19. 
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We examined two potential mediators of this predicted relationship. Specifically, we 
investigated the extent to which belief in conspiracy theories, and feelings of powerlessness, 
mediate the relationship between cultural orientation and intentions to engage in behaviours 
that reduce the spread of COVID-19.  
Conspiracy theories 
Conspiracy theories have been a prominent feature of the pandemic, from the notion 
that China manufactured the disease as a bioweapon to use against the west, to the idea that 
5G technologies spread it (van Bavel et al., 2020). Although no research to date directly links 
belief in conspiracy theories to individualism or collectivism, there is much indirect evidence 
suggesting that they should be related. For example, the need for uniqueness, which is argued 
to be a central feature of individualism (e.g., Cai et al., 2018; Wang, Fan, & Ouyang, 2017), 
consistently predicts conspiracy beliefs (Hart & Graether, 2018; Lantian et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, individualists (versus collectivists) score higher on the Dark Triad (narcissism, 
Machiavellianism, and psychopathy; Wilson & Hartley, 2015), and these traits also 
consistently predict conspiracy beliefs (Cichocka et al., 2015; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; 
March & Springer, 2019). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that individualism will be 
positively, and collectivism negatively, associated with belief in conspiracy theories.   
In turn, belief in conspiracy theories has important social and health-related 
consequences (Douglas et al., 2019) including reduced engagement with mainstream politics, 
climate change initiatives, and vaccination programmes (Jolley and Douglas, 2014a, b), and 
has been identified as a likely obstacle to constructive public responses to the pandemic (van 
Bavel et al., 2020). Drawing this research together, we therefore predict that individualists 
(versus collectivists) will show decreased compliance with COVID-19 mitigating activities as 
a consequence of their belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories.  
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Powerlessness 
Cultural orientation is also associated with feelings of powerlessness—the sense of 
being unable to make a meaningful impact on important issues (Xiang et al., 2019). For 
example, Xiang et al. found that individualism was positively—and collectivism was 
negatively—related to feelings of powerlessness concerning climate-change. This suggests 
that collectivists may garner feelings of power to overcome issues that require collective 
effort, whereas individualists may be less able to draw on such power. That is, collectivists 
may feel that they can rely on others to take action on global issues, making their own 
personal contribution in such cases more meaningful. Individualists, on the other hand, are 
less likely to feel empowered by collective support, ultimately making their own personal 
contribution feel less meaningful. Therefore, it is possible that feelings of powerlessness may 
help explain individualists’ and collectivists’ different responses to COVID-19.  
Research has also demonstrated that feelings of powerlessness predict health-related 
behaviours. For example, Jolley and Douglas (2014b) found that feelings of powerlessness 
mediated the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and lower vaccination intentions, a 
relationship they also demonstrated for climate-friendly behaviours (Jolley & Douglas, 
2014a). Feelings of powerlessness are therefore also likely to negatively influence people’s 
responses to the pandemic. Drawing this research together, we therefore explore the 
possibility that individualists (versus collectivists) will show decreased compliance with 
COVID-19 mitigating activities as a consequence of heightened feelings of powerlessness. 
Following previous research, we also predict that feelings of powerlessness will mediate the 
relationship between conspiracy belief and COVID-19 intentions. 
The present study  
We tested the relationships between individualism-collectivism and behavioural 
intentions during the COVID-19 pandemic. These intentions were specifically related to 
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social distancing and hygiene measures. We also examined the potential mediating roles of 
conspiracy beliefs and powerlessness. We hypothesised that both vertical and horizontal 
individualism would predict lower, and that both vertical and horizontal collectivism would 
predict higher, intentions to engage in behaviours that reduce the spread of COVID-19. 
Furthermore, we hypothesised that the relationships between individualism-collectivism and 
engagement with behaviours that reduce the spread of COVID-19 would be mediated by both 
belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and powerlessness. Finally, we expected to 
conceptually replicate previous findings by showing that powerlessness mediates the 
relationship between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and COVID-19 intentions.1 
Method 
Participants and design 
Seven hundred and twenty-four participants2 were recruited for this correlational 
study (from 4th to 13th April 2020) via advertisements on social media (n = 413) and Reddit 
forums (n = 311)3. We excluded participants who failed at least one of two attention checks 
(n = 20). The remaining participants (n = 704; 376 women, 306 men, 10 non-binary, 10 rather 
not say, 2 transgender, Mage = 37.26 years, SDage = 12.51)4 were included in the final 
analyses. Of this sample, 34.2% were British, 30.4% were American, and the remaining 
35.4% were made up of 64 different nationalities.5 
 
1 We included additional variables and hypotheses but omit them here due to space restrictions. The key 
pre-registered hypothesis (i.e., that vertical and horizontal individualism would predict lower, and that 
vertical and horizontal collectivism would predict higher, COVID-19 intentions) is presented here. Two of 
the pre-registered mediation hypotheses (i.e., that relationships between individualism-collectivism and 
COVID-19 intentions would be mediated by both conspiracy beliefs and powerlessness, and that 
powerlessness would mediate the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and intentions) are also 
presented here. Pre-registration documentation is 
here: https://osf.io/sqtpz/?view_only=cb1a947ac12a41ec8e35c878df76c1a4 and other pre-registered 
analyses are presented in the Supplementary Materials. 
2 According to Fritz and MacKinnon (2007), to detect a small mediation effect with a power of .8 using 
bias-corrected bootstrapping, a minimum sample size of 462 is required. 
3 Controlling for method of data collection did not affect the pattern of results (see Supplementary 
Materials). 
4 Age is based on n = 701. 
5 Nationality is based on n = 694.  
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Materials and procedure 
The questionnaire was designed and administered using Qualtrics. Participants read 
an information page and gave their consent to take part. They were then asked to complete a 
series of measures in random order, except for the demographic measures that always 
appeared in the same order at the end of the questionnaire. 
To measure intentions to reduce the spread of COVID-19 participants reported the 
likelihood that they would engage in 12 behaviours. Eight related to social distancing (e.g., 
“Remain at least 2 metres (6 feet) apart from other people”; “Isolate yourself for at least 1 
week if you show even mild cold or flu symptoms”; 1 = definitely not to 5 = definitely yes, α 
= .73) and four were related to hygiene measures (e.g., “Wash your hands after every outing”; 
“Wash your hands before eating”; α = .55). Individualism-collectivism was measured using 
Triandis and Gelfland’s (1998) scale. Participants rated the extent to which 16 items 
described them. Four items measured vertical individualism (e.g., “It is important that I do 
my job better than others” and “Winning is everything”; 1 = definitely no to 5 = definitely 
yes, α = .65), four measured horizontal individualism (e.g., “I’d rather depend on myself than 
others” and “My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me”; α = .64), 
four measured vertical collectivism (e.g., “It is important to me that I respect the decisions 
made by my groups” and “Parents and children must stay together as much as possible”; α = 
.64), and four measured horizontal collectivism (e.g., “I feel good when I cooperate with 
others” and “To me, pleasure is spending time with others”; α = .69). 
We designed 10 statements measuring belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories (e.g., 
“Coronavirus was purposefully created in, and released from, a biochemistry lab in Wuhan, 
China” and “The implementation of 5G technology is a means of deliberately spreading 
Coronavirus”; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree, α = .90). A three-item scale of 
powerlessness concerning the spread of COVID-19 was adapted from Jolley and Douglas 
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(2014a, b; e.g., “I feel that the Coronavirus is too big for my actions to have an impact”; “I 
feel that my actions will not affect the outcome of Coronavirus”; 1 = strongly disagree and 6 
= strongly agree, α = .88). 
Lastly, participants provided demographic details, which we included as control 
variables. In addition to age and gender, they rated their education level (1 = high (senior) 
school/lower, 2 = bachelor’s, 3 = master’s, 4 = post-graduate/higher), religiosity (1 = not 
religious at all, 7 = very religious), and political orientation (1 = extremely left-wing, 5 = 
extremely right-wing). We also controlled for whether participants had any underlying health 
conditions that may impact the severity of symptoms if they contracted COVID-19 (yes or 
no). Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked. 
Results 
Means, standard deviations and zero-order correlations are in Table 1. To test our 
hypotheses, we used the Lavaan package in R to perform Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA) and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). Inspection of normality statistics showed 
that the data for a number of items in the intentions and conspiracy belief scales were 
skewed. Therefore, bootstrapping was performed on all subsequent analyses.  
After creating CFA models for each of our IVs, potential mediators, and DVs, we 
performed SEM controlling for our demographic variables6 and using the factors from our 
CFA, achieving reasonable overall global and local fit, c2(904) = 2015.05, p < .001; CFI = 
.89; TLI = .88; RMSEA = .04, p = 1; SRMR = .06 (see Figure 1).7 Although this final model 
 
6 So that we could include gender as a dichotomous variable in the analysis, we excluded participants who 
did not report being male or female (n = 22; remaining n = 682). 
7 Due to skewness and kurtosis, one item from the social distancing measure was removed (“Isolate 
yourself for at least 1 week if you know you have been in contact with someone with Coronavirus”) and 
one hygiene item was also removed (“Wash your hands after using the toilet”). This was not problematic 
conceptually since similar items were already included in the analyses. The final sub-scales provided the 
best model fit and reliability was not compromised by removing these items (social distancing a = .73, 
hygiene a = .52).  
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did not quite achieve good global fit, we stopped adding paths recommended by the 
modification indices when adding said paths started worsening the model fit.  
In the model, social distancing intentions were positively predicted by horizontal 
collectivism, but only indirectly through lower feelings of powerlessness, indirect effect = .04 
[0.02, 0.06] (see Figure 1). Vertical individualism, however, negatively predicted social 
distancing intentions, directly and indirectly through belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories, 
indirect effect = -.04 [-0.06, -0.02], and powerlessness, indirect effect = -0.02 [-0.04, -0.01]. 
Vertical collectivism positively predicted social distancing on a direct path alone. Hygiene 
intentions were only positively predicted by horizontal collectivism, both directly and 
indirectly through lower powerlessness, indirect effect = .05 [0.02, 0.07] (see Figure 2).8 
Finally, as predicted, belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories negatively predicted social 
distancing intentions both directly and indirectly through powerlessness, indirect effect = -.04 
[-0.05, -0.01].9  
Discussion 
Individualists and collectivists showed different intentions to engage in activities that 
reduce the spread of COVID-19. Specifically, vertical individualism directly predicted lower 
intentions to engage in social distancing behaviours. Levels of collectivism (both horizontal 
and vertical), on the other hand, directly predicted higher social distancing intentions. 
Furthermore, horizontal collectivism positively predicted hygiene-related intentions, but 
individualism was not associated with these behaviours. Interestingly, support for our 
hypotheses was stronger for the social distancing than hygiene intentions. However, 
supporting Gelfand’s (2020) analysis, the current research broadly suggests that a “tighter” 
cultural orientation is associated with positive responses to the pandemic, and that 
 
8 Results remained largely the same when controlling for nationality (see Supplementary Materials). 
9 Model fit was less satisfactory without the link between COVID-19 conspiracy belief and powerlessness. 
See Supplementary Materials for the alternative model.  
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government efforts to improve compliance could therefore consider promoting a collectivist 
orientation amongst the general public.  
The current research also adds to existing findings by demonstrating that 
individualist-collectivist differences in response to COVID-19 were further influenced by 
feelings of personal power. In addition, vertical individualists (but not collectivists) appear to 
be affected by the conspiracy theories that are circulating about COVID-19. The current 
“infodemic” surrounding COVID-19 (WHO, 2020b) may also therefore be more likely to 
affect individualist versus collectivist cultures. Interventions that focus on empowerment and 
those that address conspiracy theories and other forms of misinformation are therefore likely 
to improve people’s engagement with behaviours that reduce the spread of COVID-19.  
Our results also support previous findings that collectivists, versus individualists, are 
more likely to display adaptive responses during times of crisis more generally (e.g., Murray 
et al., 2011; Schaller & Duncan, 2007). The positive link between levels of individualism, 
powerlessness, and COVID-19 inaction also corroborates Xiang et al.’s (2019) findings in the 
context of climate change. Moreover, the current findings extend previous literature 
demonstrating a link between conspiracy belief, powerlessness, and climate change inaction 
(see Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, b), by demonstrating that this link may be particularly 
important for individualists in the case of COVID-19. Whilst the correlational nature of this 
study restricts us from making conclusions about cause and effect, previous research suggests 
that our final mediation models are similar to experimental results in other contexts (see 
Xiang et al., 2019; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, b). The current findings are therefore likely to 
be useful beyond the COVID-19 crisis.  
Some other limitations of the current study need to be noted. Despite the large sample 
size and inclusion of 65 nationalities, almost 80% of the participants were either American or 
British. The study is therefore not internationally representative and does not allow us to test 
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for cross-cultural or cross-national differences. Future research should access collectivist 
communities to increase the generalizability of these findings. It should also include a general 
measure of conspiracy belief, such as the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS; 
Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013), in order to examine more general links between 
individualism-collectivism, conspiracy beliefs, powerlessness, and intentions. We also note 
that effect sizes in the current study were small, suggesting that many other factors influence 
the COVID-19 response. Furthermore, the literature requires experimental investigations of 
the indirect paths observed in our results (van den Bos, van Veldhuizen, & Au, 2015). This 
would allow us to more stringently evaluate behavioural scientists’ recommendation to 
promote collectivism (SAGE, 2020) as part of the COVID-19 response.   
Overall, the current research provides further insight into the potential role of 
individualism-collectivism in times of crisis. Clearly communicating that “we are all in this 
together” could be a fruitful endeavour in encouraging people to comply in this particular 
case and also during future crises. National leaders would also do well to follow this advice 
themselves and set an example for the general public. The current research also emphasises 
the importance of examining the interplay between cultural factors and personal feelings 
(powerlessness) and information consumption (conspiracy theories) in this time of crisis. 
Finally, it raises the interesting possibility that during crises, collectivism encourages a 
powerful response, but individualism removes a sense of power and replaces it with 
potentially harmful conspiracy beliefs.  
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Table 1. 
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations. 
   
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Hygiene intentions 3.85 0.63 - .35*** -.10** .02 .08* .15*** -.02 -.24*** 
2. Social distancing intentions 4.31 0.65  - -.14*** -.04 .08* .18*** -.16*** -.26*** 
3. Vertical individualism 4.24 1.52   - .23*** .17*** -.16*** .14*** .23*** 
4. Horizontal individualism 6.61 1.33    - -.04 -.14*** .08* .12** 
5. Vertical collectivism 6.15 1.49     - .32*** .09* -.04 
6. Horizontal collectivism 6.75 1.31      - -.03 -.26*** 
7. COVID-19 conspiracies 1.50 0.57       - .18*** 
8. Powerlessness 2.46 1.20        - 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
   




Figure 1. Predictors of social distancing intentions in the final SEM model (controlling for 
demographics). Non-significant paths, demographic paths, and paths predicting hygiene 
intentions have been removed for ease of viewing. Direct effects are reported in parentheses, 
and total effects are reported without parentheses. The total effect of vertical individualism 
on social distancing is firstly reported through conspiracy beliefs, and secondly through 
powerlessness. All values are standardised beta coefficients 
 
  




Figure 2. Predictors of hygiene intentions in the final SEM model (controlling for 
demographics).Non-significant paths, demographic paths, and paths predicting social 
distancing intentions have been removed for ease of viewing. Direct effects are reported in 
parentheses, and total effects are reported without parentheses. All values are standardised 
beta coefficients. 
